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Single Question. Whether Impotency for the Carnal Act Impede Matrimony Simply
1. “Now it remains to consider etc.” [Lombard, Sent. IV d.34 ch.1].
2. About this thirty fourth distinction I ask whether impotence for the carnal act impedes matrimony simply.
3. That it does not:
Because this would only be because, by contracting [matrimony] one obligates oneself to the act, for impotence only impedes as to the rendering of the debt and exercising the act; but this is false, because one can contract with a will at once to enter Religion.
4. Again, it would then follow that an old man would be impeded from contracting matrimony, the opposite of which is held by the Church, which allows such marriages.
5. 5. Again, sorcery is not a perpetual impediment, for the one ensorcelled can, it is plain, be cured by destruction of the sorcery; and, as it is now, temporary impotence is not an impediment; therefore at least impotence through sorcery does not impede matrimony.
6. The opposite:
Gratian, Decretum, p.2 cause 33 q.1 ch.4., “If by fortune tellers”
7. Again, Gregory IX, Decretals IV tit.15 chs.7, 2, “Those who are impotent are reckoned not to be suited to contracting matrimony.”
I. To the Question
8. First one must look at the conclusion in general; second at double impotence in particular
A. About the Conclusion in General
9. In general, all impotence simply and permanent, namely that cannot be aided by nature or art, impedes contracting matrimony simply, if it precede it, and dissolves one already contracted.
10. And for this there is, from the nature of this contract, a threefold reason:
First because this contract is a giving of the power of the body for such act, if it be asked for; but this93 [impotent person] has no such power; therefore he can give nothing such; therefore neither can he so contract.
11. Again, in this contract one obligates oneself to such act, if it be asked for; but such an act is impossible for him, even if it be asked for; therefore he obligates himself to what is impossible. But an obligation for what is impossible is null, by divine Law; therefore, divine Law does not approve such an obligation; therefore it is null.
12. Again, some other person intends to exchange the power of body with the power of body of a second person; therefore, the belief is that the other person is able, conversely, to make the exchange; but the other person cannot; therefore there is error here pertaining to something that is per se required for the contract; such an error makes the contract null, as was said above, d.30 q.1 nn.9-13.
This then is said about impotence in general.
13. But if such impotence follow a consummated matrimony, it does not dissolve it, because the power was handed over, and the one to whom it was handed over has been put in possession of it; therefore it cannot be revoked on account of any supervening impediment.
14. But if such impediment intervenes between a ratified and a consummated matrimony, it is doubtful whether it dissolve it; Gratian, Decretum, p.2 cause 33 chapter 1, seems to state the negative side, other chapters the affirmative side, “marriage is confirmed by carrying out the office [of matrimony];” and afterwards follows, “before it be confirmed, the impossibility to perform the office dissolves the bond.”
15. The contrary seems to be the case, for the power has already been given; therefore, if an impediment to the use of it happen afterwards, not for this reason can the prior giving be rescinded. Whether it did not precede a ratified matrimony, if yet it did precede a consummated one, would be difficult to judge, unless perhaps there was, intervening at that time, a removal of some part necessary for the act.
B. About Double Impotence in Particular
16. About the second article [n.8]:
There is a double impotence in genus: natural and by occasion. Natural in a man is frigidity, in a woman constriction; by occasion is through sorcery.
17, The first impossibility is plain.
18. The second impossibility is this: evil spirits, who have compacts with certain men, keep their promises with them through certain chants or herbs or this sort of thing, not because they are honest but in order that others adhere to them (because if they kept no compacts no one would serve them), and in order that those for whom they keep the promises worship them, because, from pride, their chief desire is for divine honors.
19. God also permits them to exercise power over others (because of these others’ sins or some other hidden cause) to impede these others from certain acts that they would have power for if they were not impeded. For because the devil has power, unless he be impeded by God, over the whole of corporeal nature, therefore can he prevent such and such bodily members from having such and such effects, and this by incantations or other things of the sort; and thus can he prevent this act [of carnal union] in this person in relation to such and such person.
20. And in this way does a sorceress, who has a pact with a demon, procure from the demon his impeding this person from this act with this woman, as long as such sorcery lasts, as a bent pin94 or something of the sort. And this frequently happens through the sorcery of such a woman, who procures and invokes the devil under a certain pact for the impeding of such act between such persons.
21. And this impediment by occasion is called [malicious]95 sorcery, because the devil, for malicious procuring of someone, impedes the act, or something else of the sort.
22. What then is the remedy against this impediment by demons?
I reply: if the power of the demon is impeded by the prayers of the saints, it is well done. If God not answer the prayers, if the sorcery be known and destroyed, the demon would not vex further, because, from the pact, he only assists while the sign lasts.
23. And from this is plain that deceitful is the question whether it is licit to take away the sorcery with the intention of curing the one has been ensorcelled. For it is licit, indeed meritorious, to destroy the works of the devil. Nor is there any infidelity in this, because he who destroys the sorcery is not acquiescing in evil works, but he believes the demon can and wants to vex as long as such sign lasts, and the destruction of this sign puts an end to the vexing.
24. About these two impediments I say, as to the issue in hand, that they are in some way similar and in some way dissimilar.
Similar because they prevent contracting matrimony and break off the contract already made with respect to the person with respect to whom these impediments exist. Which I say and add to this extent, that not only an occasional but also a natural impediment can exist with respect to one person, not with respect to the other, especially a natural one in a woman.
25. But after divorce there is a double difference.
One, that someone who has an occasional impediment may licitly contract a matrimony, and if after the contract there is carnal union, it ought not to be rendered to the prior spouse, because someone ensorcelled with respect to one person is not, for this reason, ensorcelled with respect to all; for he is ensorcelled as the ministers of the devil get hold of him, through the sorcery of the devil, for being impeded. But it can be that some sorceress want him to be perpetually impeded with respect to this person, not with respect to another, as if she not wish him to marry this woman but herself or someone else.
26. But the other, namely the one who has a perpetual natural impediment, and this with respect to anyone, must remain without hope of marriage, and it would be safe for him to enter Religion. But if he contract matrimony in fact afterwards and have carnal union, he is compelled to return to the prior spouse, because it appears that the sentence of divorce proceeded from an error, and that it was no error before God and that the matrimony was true, because there was not the impediment supposed.
27. But how does the perpetuity of this impediment become known?
It is contained in Gregory IX, Decretals IV tit.15 ch.5, “Praiseworthy”: they should delay for three years and make efforts for the act; and if afterwards they protest [sc. failure], they must swear with a seventh hand [sc. seven witnesses], that is, man and wife by knowledge and seven neighbors by fidelity; and if the man protest the accusation of the wife, the man is believed, because “he is the head of the woman” [Ephesians 5.23, Decretals ch.1]; and if the man accuse, the proof rests on him in the aforesaid way.
28. But how will the difference between this and that impediment be known?
I reply; it is difficult save by inspection of the body, whether some necessary disposition is stopped in the part required for this act; or by the judgment of doctors as to frigidity, if any signs display him to be of such complexion. But if neither this way nor that, and yet he is simply impeded, one must presume that it is sorcery.
II. To the Initial Arguments
29. To the first argument [n.3] I agree that one obligates oneself to the act if it be asked for, at least for some determinate time; but within that time it is not necessary to render the act if one want to enter Religion. But one cannot obligate oneself to the act for any time at all if there is a perpetual impediment, because, as said at the beginning of the solution [n.9], only perpetual impediments impede, and it is contained in Gregory IX, Decretals IV tit.15 ch.6, “Fraternity.”
30. To the second [n.4], if the old man be altogether impotent, I would say that he would not contract matrimony, although she96 could perhaps licitly allow certain things to him for living together as brother and sister; and thus perhaps do many women espouse to themselves wealth rather than persons.
31. To the third [n.5] the answer is plain from what was said [nn.17-23]: if the sorcery is temporary, it only impedes temporarily; but it is presumed to be perpetual if it persist for three years.